The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Mining in 2026: supply, demand, and the sources beyond the mine

Primer • The Front End • Status as of 20 October 2026

Abstract

The output of uranium mines answers a price signal years after the signal is sent. The primer makes that point in a short box on supply lag. Two reports published since then put numbers on it. Both project reactor requirements rising. Both show the mines that exist or are committed today falling short of the higher projections within about a decade.

This article asks whether mine supply can keep pace with reactors, and what fills the gap if it cannot. It looks at what the recent restarts have added, what governments have done, and the sources beyond the mine, from phosphate rock to seawater. It ends with the prices at which recycling would start to replace mined uranium.

The Question

Chapter 4 of the primer has a box called “Supply Signal Lag”. A conventional mine takes a decade or more from discovery to first production, and an in-situ recovery project takes several years. The mines reopening now therefore “reflect decisions made when prices were lower.” The question is whether the mines now operating, and those already committed, can meet what reactors will need over the next decade.

Two reports now give an answer. The World Nuclear Association published its World Nuclear Fuel Report on 5 September 2025 [1]. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency launched the 31st edition of their “Red Book”, Uranium 2026: Resources, Production and Demand, on 14 September 2026 [2].

Two Curves

Demand

Reactors now need more uranium each year than the mines produce. The Red Book puts world reactor requirements at about 64,500 tonnes of uranium in 2024 [3]. The World Nuclear Association, which counts differently, puts requirements at about 68,920 tonnes in 2025 [1].

Both publishers expect requirements to grow. In the Association’s reference case, requirements reach just over 150,000 tonnes a year in 2040, more than twice today’s level [1]. The Red Book’s 2050 projections run from about 84,800 tonnes a year in its low case to about 143,900 tonnes in its high case [3]. Table 1 gives the full set.

Supply from existing mines

The world’s mines produced 61,924 tonnes in 2024 by the Red Book’s count [3] [2]. The World Nuclear Association’s own tally is 60,213 tonnes [4]. Either way, mines supplied a little less than reactors used. The Association puts mined uranium at 90 percent of reactor requirements in 2024 [1].

The Red Book then asks how long existing mines, together with those already committed, can meet requirements. In its low-demand case they do so through 2032. In its high-demand case a shortfall is “anticipated as early as 2025”, which is to say already [3]. The World Nuclear Association reaches a similar view: “existing mines face a depletion of resources in the middle of the next decade” [1].

Part of any gap is filled by secondary supply: uranium held in inventories, re-enriched tails and recycled material. The rest must come from mines that are not yet committed.

TABLE 1. World uranium requirements and mine production, as published.

Measure	2024	2025	2040	2050
Requirements, World Nuclear Association (tonnes of uranium a year)	Not given	About 68,920 [1]	107,000 / 150,000 / 204,000 (lower / reference / upper) [1]	Not covered
Nuclear capacity behind those cases (gigawatts)	Not given	Not given	552 / 746 / 966 [1]	Not covered
Requirements, Red Book 2026 (tonnes of uranium a year)	About 64,500 [3]	Not given	Not retrieved	84,800 / 143,900 (low / high) [3]
Nuclear capacity behind those cases (gigawatts)	Not given	Not given	Not retrieved	565 / 916 (low / high) [3]
World mine production (tonnes of uranium)	61,924 (Red Book) [3]; 60,213 (World Nuclear Association) [4]	Not yet compiled	Not applicable	Not applicable

The two publishers count requirements differently, so their figures are shown separately rather than combined. The Red Book’s year-by-year tables of production capability were not retrieved for this article.

The table shows two lines moving apart. On the Red Book’s figures, requirements in 2050 would be between 1.4 and 2.3 times what the world’s mines produced in 2024 [3]. Every tonne between the two lines must come from secondary supply or from projects that are not yet committed.

What the Restarts Have Added

The first response to higher prices has been to restart and expand mines that already exist. The United States, Canada and Kazakhstan show how much that has added, and how fast.

United States

US output has grown quickly from a very small base. Mines sell uranium oxide concentrate, or yellowcake, written U₃O₈, and its price is quoted per pound. The Energy Information Administration, which reports in pounds of U₃O₈, counts US production at about 250 tonnes of uranium in 2024 and about 810 tonnes in 2025 [5]. Table 2 also gives the agency’s pound figures. In the first half of 2026 the mines produced about as much as in all of 2025 [6]. Table 2 gives the quarterly figures.

Six facilities produced in the second quarter of 2026: Ross, Lost Creek, Smith Ranch-Highland and Willow Creek in Wyoming; Alta Mesa in Texas; and the White Mesa mill in Utah [6]. All but White Mesa are in-situ recovery operations, which pump a solution through the ore underground and bring the dissolved uranium to the surface [5].

A restart still takes time, and it does not always go to plan. Ur-Energy decided to build its Shirley Basin project in Wyoming in March 2024 and began capturing uranium from its first wellfield on 23 April 2026, about two years later [7].

Peninsula Energy withdrew its 2026 guidance for Lance, also in Wyoming, on 22 July 2026 because the wellfield had ramped up more slowly than expected [8]. It now expects about 190 to 230 tonnes of uranium in 2027 [8].

Set against what US reactors use, the new output is still small. US reactors loaded fuel containing about 15,730 tonnes of uranium (40.9 million pounds of U₃O₈ equivalent) in 2025 [9]. Domestic production was about 5 percent of that [5] [9]. Canada, Kazakhstan and Australia together supplied three-quarters of the uranium delivered to US owners and operators [9].

TABLE 2. US uranium production and use, as reported by the Energy Information Administration.

Measure	2024	2025	First half of 2026
Production, tonnes of uranium (pounds of U₃O₈)	About 250 (657,000) [5]	About 810 (about 2.1 million) [5]	About 818 (2,126,579): Q1 about 400 (1,039,075); Q2 about 418 (1,087,504) [6]
Employment (person-years)	506 [5]	711 [5]	Not given
Industry spending (US$)	160.0 million [5]	234.7 million [5]	Not given
Fuel loaded in US reactors, tonnes of uranium (million pounds of U₃O₈ equivalent)	About 18,500 (48.1) [9]	About 15,730 (40.9) [9]	Not given
Deliveries to US owners and operators, tonnes of uranium (million pounds of U₃O₈ equivalent)	About 21,500 (55.9) [9]	About 18,040 (46.9) [9]	Not given
Origin of 2025 deliveries	—	Canada 32%, Kazakhstan 28%, Australia 15%, US 7% (includes inventory) [9]	—

Canada

Canada’s largest mine is producing below its target. Cameco’s McArthur River/Key Lake operation produced about 5,810 tonnes of uranium in 2025, against Cameco’s stated target of about 6,920 tonnes a year [10] [11]. Its guidance for 2026 stays below that target [10]. Cigar Lake produced about 7,350 tonnes [10]. Cameco reports in pounds of U₃O₈; Table 3 gives both. Table 3 gives each producer’s guidance.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is the largest single source of mined uranium, and its output depends on sulphuric acid. Kazatomprom produced 25,839 tonnes in 2025, which the World Nuclear Association puts at about 40 percent of world output [10] [12]. Its guidance for 2026 is “subject to sulphuric acid availability” [10].

The reason is the mining method. Kazakhstan’s mines are almost all in-situ recovery wellfields that dissolve the uranium with acid. They use 70 to 80 kilograms of sulphuric acid for each kilogram of uranium [12]. A shortage of acid therefore limits output directly.

The country’s tax rules changed in 2026. Since 1 January its mineral extraction tax has risen with annual output, from 4 to 18 percent, with an extra charge when the uranium price is above $70 a pound [12].

TABLE 3. Output and guidance of the largest producers, 100 percent basis.

Operation	2025 output	2026 guidance	Stated target
McArthur River/Key Lake (Cameco)	About 5,810 t (15.1 million lb U₃O₈) [10]	About 5,390–6,350 t (14–16.5 million lb) [10]	About 6,920 t a year (18 million lb) [11]
Cigar Lake (Cameco)	About 7,350 t (19.1 million lb U₃O₈) [10]	About 6,730–6,920 t (17.5–18 million lb) [10]	Not given
Kazatomprom	25,839 tonnes [10]	27,500–29,000 tonnes, subject to acid availability [10]	Not given

New mines licensed in 2026

Restarts add output from mines that already exist. New mines take longer, and two Canadian projects moved forward in 2026. In February the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission licensed Denison Mines to prepare the site for and build its Phoenix in-situ recovery mine in the Athabasca Basin. Denison took its final investment decision on 24 February and aims to start production by mid-2028 [13].

On 5 March 2026 the Commission licensed NexGen Energy’s Rook I project for site preparation and construction [14]. The licence does not allow the mine to operate. Operation will need a further hearing and decision [14].

Phoenix shows the last stage of the lag. A mine licensed and financed in early 2026 is scheduled to produce in 2028 [13]. In the Red Book’s low case, existing and committed mines stop covering requirements after 2032 [3].

What the US Government Has Done

Government action is another way supply could change. For uranium mining, the federal record in this period is mostly listing, permitting and designation:

• Listing. The US Geological Survey’s final 2025 list of critical minerals, published in November 2025, added uranium on the Department of Energy’s recommendation [15].
• Emergency permitting. The Interior Department approved Anfield Energy’s Velvet-Wood mine in Utah on 23 May 2025, after a review of about fourteen days. It was the first project approved under its emergency permitting process [16].
• FAST-41. Several uranium projects were placed under the federal FAST-41 process, which coordinates agency permitting timetables. One is enCore Energy’s Dewey-Burdock project in South Dakota, added on 28 August 2025 [17].
• Section 232. A proclamation of 14 January 2026 found that imports of processed critical minerals threaten national security, and named uranium among the minerals the energy sector relies on. It imposed no tariffs or quotas. It directed negotiations and asked negotiators to consider price floors [18].

Federal money has gone further down the fuel chain. The Government Accountability Office reviewed federal uranium supply efforts in August 2026. It records up to $187.5 million to expand the single US conversion plant, and $2.7 billion in task orders to three enrichment companies [19]. It identifies no federal award for uranium mining [19]. The last federal purchases of US-mined uranium were made for the Uranium Reserve in December 2022 [20].

Beyond the Mine

If mines fall short, uranium can come from other places. Some of these sources have been used before. None is yet a large supply.

By-product sources

Uranium has been recovered from phosphate rock, which typically carries 70 to 200 grams of uranium in each tonne of rock. Eight US plants recovered it from phosphoric acid from the 1970s until 1998, when recovery became uneconomic. About 20,000 tonnes has been recovered from phosphates worldwide [21]. No phosphate-uranium plant was found to be operating in 2026.

Uranium also comes out of some copper mines. BHP’s Olympic Dam mine in South Australia produced 2,693 tonnes as a by-product of copper in 2024 [4].

Seawater: how much there is

Seawater is the boundary case the primer describes in Chapter 2: the uranium is certainly there, but it is not yet economic to recover. Each tonne of seawater holds about 3 milligrams of uranium, at least 4 billion tonnes in all [22]. Chinese official reporting gives about 4.5 billion tonnes [23].

That is far more than the land holds. The Red Book counts 8.1 million tonnes of identified land resources recoverable at a cost below about $100 a pound of U₃O₈ [3]. The seawater total is about 550 times as much.

Rivers replace the ocean’s uranium, but slowly. A 2002 study by Dunk, Mills and Jenkins puts the uranium that rivers carry into the sea at about 10,000 tonnes a year [24]. That is roughly one-sixth of what the world’s reactors now require [3].

Seawater: what has been shown

Extraction from seawater has been shown at gram and kilogram scale. No plant has been built. Table 4 lists the main results.

TABLE 4. Uranium from seawater: published results.

Year	Who	Result	Cost or status
2016	Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest and University of Texas team (US)	Adsorbent fibres held 6.56 grams of uranium per kilogram of fibre after 56 days in natural seawater [25]	Estimated about $160–330 per pound of U₃O₈ ($420–860 per kilogram of uranium), in 2015 dollars, for the demonstrated procedures [25]
2018	Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and LCW Supercritical Technologies (US)	About 5 grams of yellowcake from three month-long tests, each on about 0.9 kilograms (two pounds) of modified acrylic fibre in Sequim Bay seawater [22]	Demonstration only [22]
2025	Laboratory, Nature Sustainability paper	Bipolar electrochemical cell; near-complete extraction in test solutions holding 1–100 grams of uranium per tonne, far richer than seawater [27]	Projected about $32 per pound of U₃O₈ ($83.2 per kilogram of uranium), using 1,944 kWh of electricity per kilogram [27]
2025	China, Ministry of Natural Resources	Kilogram-scale uranium product extracted in a real marine environment [23]	No quantity, site, method or cost published [23]
July 2026	SuperCritical Materials (US), under an exclusive Department of Energy licence	Hopes a first plant could produce about 840 tonnes of uranium (1.85 million pounds) a year from 2030 or 2031 [26]	No final investment decision [26]

The best-documented cost estimate, from 2016, was about $160 to $330 per pound of U₃O₈ in 2015 dollars [25]. That is above the September 2026 long-term price indicator of $96.50 a pound [31], although the two are in different years’ dollars.

When Recycling Would Compete

Recycling is the other way to stretch the supply. The primer’s closed-cycle chapters rest on physics: a fast-reactor cycle draws about sixty times more energy from each tonne of uranium than today’s reactors [28]. Whether reprocessing and recycling replace mined uranium is a question of price. Published studies have put numbers on it, and Table 5 sets them out.

TABLE 5. Uranium prices at which recycling would compete, by study.

Study	Case	Uranium price at which recycling competes (per pound of U₃O₈; per kilogram of uranium in brackets)
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2013	Multiple recycling of plutonium in light-water and fast reactors	About $104–115 ($270–300), no currency year stated [29]
Belfer Center, Harvard, 2003	Plutonium recycling in light-water reactors, reprocessing at $1,000 per kilogram of fuel	Above about $138 (above $360) [30]
Belfer Center, Harvard, 2003	Fast reactors costing $200 more per kilowatt of capacity to build than light-water reactors	About $131 ($340) [30]
Belfer Center, Harvard, 2003	Fast reactors at equal capital cost	About $54 ($140) [30]

Each figure is in the dollars of its own study. A kilogram of uranium is contained in about 2.6 pounds of U₃O₈; the per-pound figures use that ratio.

The NEA found total fuel-cycle costs lowest for the once-through cycle, but the differences among the options fell within the uncertainty bands [29]. Its threshold is the point at which fresh uranium fuel would cost about 50 percent more than its reference [29].

Current prices sit below most of these thresholds. At the end of September 2026, Cameco’s month-end average of the UxC and TradeTech long-term price indicators was $96.50 a pound of U₃O₈ [31]. That is below the NEA’s threshold and the Belfer Center’s light-water and capital-premium cases, and above its equal-capital fast-reactor case, though the studies are in older dollars [29] [30].

What the price affects

The price of uranium matters much less to the cost of electricity than to the miners. Once a reactor is built, fuel is a small part of what it costs to run. In 2024, fuel was about 0.6 of the 2.3 cents per kilowatt-hour that major US investor-owned utilities spent to run their nuclear plants, a little over a quarter [32]. Those operating costs leave out the cost of building the plant, which is the largest part of the cost of new nuclear power [33].

Uranium itself is only part of the fuel cost. The uranium must be converted, enriched and made into fuel. The World Nuclear Association puts those steps at about half of the total fuel cost [33].

As a result, a change in the uranium price has a small effect on the cost of power. The Association gives a worked example for a typical US plant. Doubling the uranium price raises the fuel cost by about a quarter and the cost of generation by almost 10 percent [33]. The Association calls that impact minor. It adds that the effect would be considerable only if uranium stayed above $100 a pound for a long period [33].

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Energy Agency reached a similar result for new plants in 2020. A 50 percent change in fuel costs, up or down, changed the median cost of nuclear electricity by about 8 percent, because fixed costs dominate the total [34].

Miners see the price differently. For them it decides which deposits are worth working and which sources, such as phosphate or seawater, could ever compete. The Red Book counts about 1.9 million tonnes of identified land resources recoverable at a cost below about $31 a pound of U₃O₈ [3]. Most of the 8.1 million tonnes in its land total costs more to recover [3].

What This Means

Some of the answer is settled. Both major projections have reactor requirements rising. Both show the mines that exist or are committed today falling short of the higher projections within about a decade [1] [3]. The restarts have raised output, but US production is still a small share of US use [5] [9]. New Canadian mines are licensed, and their output is years away [13] [14]. The lag the primer describes is visible in these numbers.

Other parts are open. The size of the gap depends on the Red Book’s year-by-year capability tables and on how much capacity moves into the committed category in its next edition. Kazakhstan’s output depends on acid supply and on its new tax regime [12]. Federal support has so far reached conversion and enrichment, not mining [19]. Seawater extraction has not moved past demonstration [23] [26]. Recycling thresholds rest on cost studies, and the NEA’s dates from 2013 [29].

The signs to watch are concrete. They include first production at Phoenix, an operating licence for Rook I, a published quantity and cost for China’s marine extraction, an investment decision on a US seawater plant, and any federal purchase, loan or equity stake involving a uranium miner.

Notes

1. World Nuclear Association, “World Nuclear Fuel Report 2025: Investment in nuclear fuel cycle needed as demand for nuclear power grows,” press statement, 5 September 2025. https://world-nuclear.org/news-and-media/press-statements/world-nuclear-fuel-report-2025-investment-in-nuclear-fuel-cycle-needed-as-demand-for-nuclear-power-grows

2. World Nuclear News, “Red Book confident on uranium resources to meet future growth,” 14 September 2026. https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/red-book-confident-on-uranium-resources-to-meet-future-growth

3. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and International Atomic Energy Agency, “Uranium 2026: Resources, Production and Demand,” NEA No. 7770, September 2026; executive summary and Chapter 1. https://oecd-nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2026-09/uranium_2026_-_resources_production_and_demand.pdf

4. World Nuclear Association, “World Uranium Mining Production,” Information Library, updated 9 October 2026; also gives Olympic Dam’s 2024 output. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production

5. US Energy Information Administration, “Domestic Uranium Production Report – Annual” (2025 data), released 23 June 2026, re-released 27 August 2026. https://www.eia.gov/uranium/production/annual/

6. US Energy Information Administration, “Domestic Uranium Production Report – Quarterly” (2nd quarter 2026), released 28 August 2026. https://www.eia.gov/uranium/production/Quarterly/

7. American Nuclear Society, Nuclear Newswire, “Ur-Energy begins ISR mining operations at Wyoming’s Shirley Basin,” 30 April 2026. https://www.ans.org/news/2026-04-30/article-7994/urenergy-begins-isr-mining-operations-at-wyomings-shirley-basin/

8. Mining Weekly, “US-focused uranium producer Peninsula Energy withdraws this year’s guidance as it resolves temporary flow rate issue,” 22 July 2026. https://www.miningweekly.com/article/us-focused-uranium-producer-peninsula-energy-withdraws-this-years-guidance-as-it-resolves-temporary-flow-rate-issue-2026-07-22

9. US Energy Information Administration, “Uranium Marketing Annual Report” (2025 data), released 29 July 2026, re-released 13 August 2026. https://www.eia.gov/uranium/marketing/index.php

10. World Nuclear News, “Cameco, Kazatomprom release 2025 production figures,” 17 February 2026. https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/cameco-kazatomprom-release-2025-figures

11. Cameco Corporation, 2025 Annual Information Form (Form 40-F Exhibit 99.1), US Securities and Exchange Commission, 19 March 2026; cited for the McArthur River production target. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1009001/000119312526116229/d34605dex991.htm

12. World Nuclear Association, “Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan,” Information Library, updated 6 October 2026. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/kazakhstan

13. Denison Mines, “Denison Announces Final Investment Decision for the Phoenix In-Situ Recovery Uranium Mine and Plans to Start Construction in March 2026,” 24 February 2026. https://denisonmines.mediaroom.com/2026-02-24-Denison-Announces-Final-Investment-Decision-for-the-Phoenix-In-Situ-Recovery-Uranium-Mine-and-Plans-to-Start-Construction-in-March-2026

14. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, “Commission issues a licence to NexGen Energy Ltd. authorizing site preparation and construction of its Rook I Project,” 5 March 2026. https://www.canada.ca/en/nuclear-safety-commission/news/2026/03/commission-issues-a-licence-to-nexgen-energy-ltd-authorizing-site-preparation-and-construction-of-its-rook-i-project.html

15. Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Geological Survey’s Critical Minerals List,” In Focus IF13145, January 2026. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IF13145.html

16. Reuters (via StreetInsider), “US approves Utah uranium mine after two-week environmental review,” 23 May 2025. https://www.streetinsider.com/Reuters/US+approves+Utah+uranium+mine+after+two-week+environmental+review/24846481.html

17. Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council, “Dewey-Burdock ISR Uranium Project latest to gain FAST-41 coverage,” 28 August 2025. https://www.permitting.gov/newsroom/press-releases/dewey-burdock-isr-uranium-project-latest-gain-fast-41-coverage

18. The White House, “Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products into the United States,” proclamation, 14 January 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/adjusting-imports-of-processed-critical-minerals-and-their-derivative-products-into-the-united-states/

19. US Government Accountability Office, “Nuclear Fuel: Actions Needed to Enhance Cost Reporting and Economic Analysis for Federal Uranium Supply Efforts,” GAO-26-107385, 20 August 2026. https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-107385/index.html

20. World Nuclear News, “US uranium producers announce contracts and production ramp-ups,” 20 December 2022; reports the Uranium Reserve purchase awards. https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/US-uranium-producers-announce-contracts-and-produc

21. World Nuclear Association, “Uranium from Phosphates,” Information Library, updated 16 May 2025. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/uranium-resources/uranium-from-phosphates

22. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, “Seawater Yields First Grams of Yellowcake,” 13 June 2018. https://www.pnnl.gov/news-media/seawater-yields-first-grams-yellowcake

23. Xinhua (新华网), report on the Ministry of Natural Resources’ 2025 National Seawater Utilization Report (《2025年全国海水利用报告》), 8 June 2026. https://www.news.cn/20260608/451dd227a1954c7db1e5ef8b95e7732d/c.html

24. R. M. Dunk, R. A. Mills and W. J. Jenkins, “A reevaluation of the oceanic uranium budget for the Holocene,” Chemical Geology 190 (2002) 45–67; repository record with abstract. https://repository.geologyscience.ru/handle/123456789/30754

25. T. Saito et al. (ORNL, PNNL and University of Texas at Austin), “New Fiber Materials with Sorption Capacity at 5.0 g-U/kg Adsorbent under Marine Testing Conditions,” DOE Fuel Cycle R&D milestone report, 30 March 2016. https://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/files/Pub62098.pdf

26. Reuters via Mining Weekly, “US company seeks to produce uranium for nuclear energy from seawater,” 15 July 2026. https://www.miningweekly.com/article/us-company-seeks-to-produce-uranium-for-nuclear-energy-from-seawater-2026-07-15

27. Y. Wang et al., “Bipolar electrochemical uranium extraction from seawater with ultra-low cell voltage,” Nature Sustainability 8 (2025) 682–691, DOI 10.1038/s41893-025-01567-z; RePEc record with abstract. https://ideas.repec.org/a/nat/natsus/v8y2025i6d10.1038_s41893-025-01567-z.html

28. World Nuclear Association, “Fast Neutron Reactors,” Information Library, updated 31 March 2026. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/fast-neutron-reactors

29. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, “The Economics of the Back End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” NEA No. 7061, 2013, executive summary. https://cms.oecd-nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2019-12/7061-ebenfc-execsum.pdf

30. M. Bunn, S. Fetter, J. P. Holdren and B. van der Zwaan, “The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel,” Belfer Center, Harvard University, December 2003. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/economics-reprocessing-vs-direct-disposal-spent-nuclear-fuel

31. Cameco Corporation, “Uranium Price,” month-end averages of UxC and TradeTech prices, accessed 20 October 2026 (latest 30 September 2026). https://www.cameco.com/invest/markets/uranium-price

32. US Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual 2024, Table 8.4, “Average Power Plant Operating Expenses for Major U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, 2014 through 2024,” released 16 October 2025. https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_08_04.html

33. World Nuclear Association, “Economics of Nuclear Power,” Information Library, updated 24 March 2026; sections on plant operating costs and the effect of uranium price. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/economic-aspects/economics-of-nuclear-power

34. International Energy Agency and OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, “Projected Costs of Generating Electricity – 2020 Edition,” 9 December 2020; section 5.4, “Fuel cost sensitivity,” p. 88. https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_51110/projected-costs-of-generating-electricity-2020-edition